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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Andres Alvarez appeals following the district court's revocation of his probation
and the district court's denial of his motion for credit for time served.

On appeal,

Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court erred when it calculated his credit for time
served. The 2015 amendments to the credit statutes, which are retroactive, require the
district court to give Mr. Alvarez credit for all the time served as a condition of his
probation. Mr. Alvarez also asserts that the district court erred in revoking his probation.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On April 13, 2013, Correctional Officer Kelly Hodge was picking up food trays in
the segregation unit at the Idaho Correctional Center.

(Presentence Investigation

Report (hereinafter, PSl), 1 p.3.) According to Officer Hodge, Mr. Alvarez threw his food
tray out through the food port, hitting him in the knee. (PSI, p.3.) This did not cause
any long term injuries. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Alvarez was charged with battery on a correctional officer. (R., p.42.) He
was found guilty following a jury trial. (R., p.110.) The district court imposed a unified
sentence of three years, with six months fixed, and the court suspended the sentence
and placed Mr. Alvarez on probation. (R., p.137.) Mr. Alvarez appealed, asserting that
the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive underlying sentence.
(R., p.146.)

In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed

Mr. Alvarez's sentence.

State v. Alvarez, 2015 Opinion No. 397 (Ct. App. March 6,

2015) (unpublished).

The designation "PSI" shall refer to the electronic file created in Idaho Supreme Court
case number 41986, containing the PSI and all attachments.
1
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Over eight months later, the State filed a report of probation violation which
alleged that Mr. Alvarez violated his probation by failing to attend treatment, failing to
report that he was fired from his job, twice failing to report to his probation officer,
changing residence without permission, and failing to pay fines, fees or costs. (Supp.

R., pp.9-18.) The State filed an amended report six months later which alleged that
Mr. Alvarez also violated his probation by being charged with two counts

of

misdemeanor battery. (Supp. R., pp.21-40.)
Mr. Alvarez admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his
probation, and the district court revoked his probation.

(Supp. R., pp.53-57.)

district court calculated Mr. Alvarez's credit for time served as 184 days.

The

(Supp.

R., pp.55-56.) Mr. Alvarez filed a timely notice of appeal. (Supp. R., pp.58-60.)
On May 26, 2015, Mr. Alvarez filed a Motion for Credit for Time Served and
supporting affidavit in which he asserted that he should have received credit for all of
the time he served in conjunction with the charge and the resulting sentence imposed
by the Court. (Supp. R., pp.63-67.)
On July 2, 2015, the district court denied Mr. Alvarez's motion without a hearing.
(Order Denying Motion for Credit for Time Served, pp.1-5, attached to the Motion to
Augment filed on October 26, 2015.)

The district court found that Mr. Alvarez was

ordered to serve 60 days as a condition of probation, but was not entitled to credit for
this time. (Order Denying Motion for Credit for Time Served, p.4, attached to the Motion
to Augment filed on October 23, 2015.)

However, the district court did adjust

Mr. Alvarez's credit calculation for a total time credited of 226 days.

(Order Denying

Motion for Credit for Time Served, p.4, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on
October 23, 2015.) The district court likewise adjusted the credit calculation to reflect
2

credit for 226 days in a corrected order revoking probation, filed on July 1, 2015.
(Corrected Order Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence and Commitment, attached
to the Motion to Augment filed on October 23, 2015.)

3

ISSUES
1

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Alvarez credit for time he served as a
condition of probation?

2.

Did the district court err in revoking Mr. Alvarez's probation?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Alvarez Credit For Time He Served As A
Condition Of Probation

A

Introduction
Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court erred when it denied him credit for time

he served as a condition of probation. Mr. Alvarez filed a pro se Motion for Credit for
Time Served and supporting affidavit in which he asserted that he should have received
credit for all of the time he served in conjunction with the charge and the resulting
sentence imposed by the Court. (Supp. R., pp.63-67.) The district court denied the
motion in part and granted the motion in part on July 2, 2015. (Order Denying Motion
for Credit for Time Served, attached to Motion to Augment, p.1, filed October 23, 2015.)
The district court acknowledged that the law governing credit for time served as a
condition of probation had been amended and noted that Mr. Alvarez had served 60
days as a condition of probation, but refused to credit Mr. Alvarez for the time. (Order
Denying Motion for Credit for Time Served. attached to Motion to Augment, pp.3-4, filed
October 23, 2015.) Although the district court also issued a corrected order revoking
probation which gave Mr. Alvarez credit for 226 days served, the district court's award
of credit specifically excepted from its re-calculation the days Mr. Alvarez served as a
condition of probation. (Corrected Order Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence and
Commitment, p.3, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on October 23, 2015.)
Mr. Alvarez respectfully requests that this Court vacate and remand this case with
instructions that Mr. Alvarez be given credit for time served for the 60 days he served as
a condition of probation.

5

B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to "[w]hether the district court properly applied the law

governing credit for time served is a question of law over which" appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal,
the appellate court will "defer to the district court's findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous." Id. An appellate court exercises free review over
questions of law. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245 (1990).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Alvarez's Request For Credit For
Time He Served As A Condition Of Probation
Mr. Alvarez asserts that the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes require the

district court to give him credit for all the time served as a condition of probation, and the
district court erred in denying his motion for credit for time served and in refusing to
award him credit for time spent on probation. 2 The Amendments to the two relevant
statutes took effect on July 1, 2015. Where the district court issued a corrected order
revoking probation on July 1, 2015, and issued its order denying Mr. Alvarez's motion
for credit for time served on July 2, 2015, the statutory language in effect at the time the
district court calculated the time Mr. Alvarez had served required the district court to
credit Mr. Alvarez with time served as a condition of probation.
Idaho Code Sections 18-309 and 19-2603 govern, inter alia, credit for
incarceration ordered as a condition of probation.
As amended, I.C. § 18-309(2) provides:

Because a motion requesting credit for time served may be brought "at any time"
pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c), credit for time served can be calculated or re-calculated at any
time. I.C.R. 35(c).
2
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In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or
suspended judgment.
I.C. § 19-2603, as amended, similarly provides:
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce
any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment
was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation. The time
such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence. The defendant
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho
Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
The amendments to both of the credit statutes became effective on July 1, 2015. See
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (H B. 64).

Because the effective date of the

amendments was on or before the date the district court's orders calculating credit for
time served were filed, the district court erred in refusing to give Mr. Alvarez credit for
time served as a condition of probation.

1.

The Plain Language Of The 2015 Amendments Requires The District
Court To Calculate Credit Pursuant To The Amendments That Were
Effective At The Time Credit Was Calculated

Mr. Alvarez asserts that this Court should hold he is entitled to credit for all of the
time spent in custody as a condition of probation. This matter is pending from a timely
appeal from the order revoking his probation, and, during the pendency of his direct
appeal, the district court filed documents calculating his credit for time served. At the
time the district court entered its orders calculating Mr. Alvarez's credit for time served,
the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes were in effect.
7

The plain language of the 2015 statutory amendments requires the district court
to calculate credit pursuant to the amendments if they were effective at the time the
court calculates time served. Specifically, I.C. § 18-309(2) provides, in relevant part: "in
computing the term of imprisonment when ... sentence has been suspended and is
later imposed, the person ... shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of
incarceration served as a condition of probation under the original . . . suspended
judgment." I.C. § 18-309(2). Under the plain language of the amendment, the statute
applies after the sentence which was suspended is later imposed. Similarly, I.C. § 192603 now provides, in relevant part:

"When the court finds that the defendant has

violated the terms and conditions of probation, it may . . . revoke probation.

The

defendant shall receive credit for time served ... for any time served as a condition of
probation under the ... suspended sentence." I.C. § 19-2603. Again, the contemplated
time for the awarding of credit is after the district court revokes probation. Thus, the
amendments clearly provide that they apply to calculations of time served made after
the amendments were effective, and no further analysis regarding retroactivity is
necessary.
Because the effective date of the amendments was on or before the date the
district court's orders calculating credit for time served were filed, the district court erred
in refusing to give Mr. Alvarez credit for time served as a condition of probation.

2.

Alternatively, Should This Court Find That The Time Calculation Must Be
Analyzed From The Dates Mr. Alvarez Actually Was Incarcerated As A
Condition Of Probation, The 2015 Amendments To The Credit Statutes
Apply Retroactively

Should this Court require the time calculation occur during the period of time
Mr. Alvarez was incarcerated as a term of his probation, Mr. Alvarez asserts that the
8

2015 amendments to the credit statutes are retroactive and require the district court to
give him credit for all the time served as a condition of probation.
The amendments to the credit statutes mandating that a defendant receive credit
for time spent incarcerated as a condition of his probation became effective on July 1,
2015.

See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch 99 (H.B. 64).

Should this Court find the

relevant inquiry is whether the time for credit to be determined is when Mr. Alvarez
actually served the time as a condition of probation, this Court must then determine
whether the amendments are retroactive. The 2015 amendments are retroactive, th us
Mr. Alvarez is entitled to credit for those days he spent incarcerated as a condition of his
probation.
The plain language of the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes expressly
declares the intent for those amendments to be retroactive. Section 18-309(2) provides
that a defendant "shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration
served as a condition of probation under the original withheld or suspended judgment."
Section 19-2603 similarly provides that a defendant "shall receive credit ... for any time
served

as

a

condition

of

probation

under

the

withheld

judgment

or

suspended sentence."
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, over which appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001 ). The Idaho Supreme
Court has outlined the following rules of statutory interpretation. "The interpretation of a
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole."
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted). "A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of
9

more than one reasonable construction
reasonable interpretation."

An unambiguous statute would have only one

Verska, 151 Idaho at 896 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but
simply follows the law as written." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

"We have

consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly
expressed intent of the legislature."

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Id.

asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning."

'The
Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Appellate courts do not have authority to revise or
void "an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce
absurd results when construed as written."

Id. at 896.

"If the statute as written is

socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." Id. at
893 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"In general, legislation acts prospectively." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928,
937 (2014).

However, there are some cases where a new piece of legislation or an

amendment to an existing statute will be retroactive in effect.

See, e.g., id. at 938

(holding that an amendment to an existing statute had retroactive effect). As the Idaho
Supreme Court has explained, '"a statute should be applied retroactively only if the
legislature has clearly expressed that intent or such intent is clearly implied by the
language of the statute."' Id. (quoting Kent v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 93 Idaho 618,
621 (1970)); cf Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (holding that courts are to give effect to the
plain language of the statute when the statute is unambiguous).
For example, the Guzman Court explained, '"if the language clearly refers to the
past as well as the future, then the intent to make the law retroactive is expressly
10

declared within the meaning of [the statute].'"

Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938 (quoting

Peavy v. Mccombs, 26 Idaho 143, 151 (1914)) (bracketed text amended). As such, an
amendment to a statute which provided, "'[w]henever any

. herd district ... has

heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be created ... by an order,' '[n]o
challenge to ... such an order, shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years has
lapsed from the date of the order,"' clearly expressed the legislative intent for that
amendment to be retroactive in scope. Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938 (quoting I.C. § 31857) (ellipses from original). The reason was "[t]his language referencing 'any' order
that 'has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be'" referred to both past and future events,
thus making that portion of the statute retroactive. See id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court held that statutory language providing:
"'[T]he administration of all rights to the use of ground water, whenever or however
acquired or to be acquired, shall, unless specifically excepted therefrom, be governed
by the provisions of this act,"' made the statute retroactive in scope "by the express
language in [that section] of the original act." A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Dep't of

Water Res., 153 Idaho 500, 508 (2012) (quoting 1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 200). As
in Guzman, it was the inclusion of "ill! rights ... whenever or however acquired or to be
acquired," thus referring to past and future events, which demonstrated the intent for the
statute to be retroactive. See id. (emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also applied this rule to statutory amendments
which alter the consequences of a criminal conviction. See State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho
849, 851 (2012) (considering whether an amendment to the sex offender registration act
was retroactive).

In Forbes, the Court determined the statutory amendment had

retroactive effect because "the Legislature, by implication, intended the amendment to
11

apply to offenders who have already been granted a withheld judgment." Id. (citing
State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580, 581-82 (2011)).

provided, in relevant part:

Specifically, the amendment

'"A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense

requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not
be subject to dismissal or reduction under this section."' Id. (quoting 2006 Idaho Sess.
Laws, Ch. 157). As in Guzman and A & B Irrigation District, it was the language "for any
offense" which expressly declared the intent for that amendment to be retroactive. 3 See
id. (emphasis added); cf Tugade v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 63, 65 (9th Cir. 1959) (per curiam)

(holding "[t]he statute, §241(a)(11) as amended, 70 Stat. 575 (1956), by its terms is
specifically made retroactive to one 'who at any time has been convicted of ... any law
... relating to the illicit possession of ... narcotic drugs .... "') (alterations in original)
(emphasis added).
Like the statutory amendment at issue in Forbes, as well as the statutes at issue
in Guzman and A & B Irrigation District, the language of the 2015 amendments to the
credit statutes expresses a clear intent for those amendments to be retroactive
in scope:
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or suspended
judgment.

The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time
That conclusion was bolstered by the fact that the Court had already determined this
amendment did not violate the protections against ex post facto laws. See Forbes, 152
Idaho at 851-52 (citing State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580, 581-82 (2011 )).

3
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served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227,
Idaho Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (amending, respectively, LC. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603)
(emphasis added). Just "[a]s the GWA[4 ] governs all water rights whenever acquired,
[and] l.C. § 31-857 governs all herd district ordinances whenever enacted," the
amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 govern all periods of incarceration served
as conditions of release on probation, whenever enforced. See Guzman, 155 Idaho at
938; cf Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851 (holding the amendment to the sex offender
registration act governs all judgments of conviction for sex offenses, whenever entered).
Thus, by using the term "any," thereby referring to past and future periods of
incarceration served as a condition of release on probation, the language of the 2015
amendments to the credit statutes expressly declared that those amendments were
retroactive in scope.
Because the Legislature made the amendments to the credit statutes retroactive
in scope, they control in Mr. Alvarez's case should this Court determine that the time for
calculation is the time he actually was in custody as a condition of probation. Thus, the
district court should have ordered that Mr. Alvarez receive credit for the 60 days he
served as a condition of probation. Because the district court did not give Mr. Alvarez
credit for all the time served as a condition of probation, it erred when it calculated his
credit for time served.
Mr. Alvarez asserts that, because the facts in the record show that he is entitled
to additional credit for time served for the time he was incarcerated as a condition of his

4

The Ground Water Act, which was at issue in A & B Irr. Dist.
13

probation, the district court erred when it denied him credit. This Court should hold that
Mr. Alvarez is entitled to credit for all of the time spent in custody in his case.

11.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Alvarez's Probation
Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
his probation and executed his original sentence of three years, with one-half year fixed.
He asserts that the violations did not justify revoking probation, especially in light of the
goals of rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society could be best served by
his continued supervision under the probation department.
There are generally two questions that must be answered by the district court in
addressing allegations of probation violations: first, the court must determine whether
the defendant actually violated the terms and conditions of his probation; and second, if
a violation of probation has been found. the trial court must then decide the appropriate
remedy for the violation. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "The
determination of whether a probation violation has been established is separate from
the decision of what consequence, if any, to impose for the violation." Id. (quoting
State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 799 (2004)). Once a probation violation has been

found, the district court must determine whether it is of such seriousness as to warrant
revoking probation. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). However,
probation may not be revoked arbitrarily.

State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055

(Ct. App. 1989). The district court must decide whether probation is achieving the goal
of rehabilitation and whether probation is consistent with the protection of society.
State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

14

If a knowing and intentional

probation violation has been proved, a district court's decision to revoke probation will
be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. I.C § 20-222; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529.
Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not
adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment,
deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has
made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order.

State v.

Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,382 (Ct. App. 1994).
As to the first issue before the district court, Mr. Alvarez concedes that he
violated conditions of his probation as he admitted that he had done so. (3/4/15 Tr., p.3,

L 16 - p.5, L 14.)

However, Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court abused its

discretion in finding that his probation violations justified revocation. Mr. Alvarez asserts
that his continued probation would achieve the goals of his rehabilitation and the
protection of society.
Although Mr. Alvarez's violations were serious, they did not justify revoking his
probation.

Mr. Alvarez admitted to violating the terms of his probation by failing to

maintain full-time employment, failing to pay fines, fees, and costs, and failing to
reimburse the county for the cost of the public defender. (3/4/15 Tr., p.3, L 16 - p.5,

L 14.) However, Mr. Alvarez took accountability for his actions and admitted he violated
his probation. (3/4/15 Tr., p.3, L.16- p.5, L.14.)
Initially, Mr. Alvarez was doing well on probation-he was employed full-time, he
was engaged in treatment and was making restitution payments.

(Addendum to

Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSl), 5 pp.17-18.) However, in June of
2014, Mr. Alvarez became ill and he began having difficulty with his living situation

15

which resulted in his getting fired from his full-time employment.

(APSI, pp.20-24.)

After the probation violation was filed, Mr. Alvarez was charged with simple assault.
(APSI, p.24.)

Yet, Mr. Alvarez has turned a corner.

He realizes he wants to be

successful on probation by doing the work and remaining in the community. (3/25/15
Tr., p.12, L.10-p.13, L.25.)
In light of all of the evidence that was presented to the district court, it abused its
discretion when revoked Mr. Alvarez's probation.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Alvarez respectfully requests that this Court order that he be given credit for
all time he was incarcerated on this case, including the time served as a condition of
probation. Additionally, Mr. Alvarez asks this Court to place him back on probation.
DATED this 26 th day of October, 2015.

SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

The designation APSI shall refer to the additional confidential sentencing materials in
the electronic file prepared for Idaho Supreme Court case number 43094.
5
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